

### What Computational Finance?

- ◆ Apply advanced computing to finance & economics
  - No consensus on definition
- ◆ Defined by activities
  - Computational intelligence
  - Optimization
- ◆ Challenging fundamentals in Economics and Finance
  - Rationality
  - Efficient market
  - Homogeneous traders

Why Computational Finance?      What are the challenges ahead?


- ◆ Forecasting and Trading
  - (Rare) opportunities, Arbitrage
- ◆ Algorithmic Trading
- ◆ Optimization
  - Portfolio optimization
- ◆ Modelling, Simulation & Machine Learning
  - Automated Bargaining
  - Artificial Markets for
    - Evolving strategies
    - Wind-tunnel testing

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### Why Computational Finance?

What can be done now:	Enabling technology:
Large scale simulation	Must faster machines
Data warehouse	Much cheaper memory
Building complex models	Agent-technology
Efficient exploration of models	<u>Evolutionary computation</u> (Multi-Obj) Optimisation
Decision support	experimental game theory, constraint satisfaction

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James Butler    Jin Li    Alma Garcia    Tsang


## Forecasting

Is the market predictable?  
What exactly is the forecasting problem?

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### Forecasting

- Will the price go up or down?  
By how much?
- What prices do we have?  
Daily? Intraday (*high frequency*)? Volume?  
Indices? Economic Models?
- What is the risk of crashing?
- Are Option and Future prices aligned?  
(i.e. are there arbitrary opportunities?)



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### EDDIE adds value to user input

- ◆ User inputs *indicators*
  - e.g. moving average, volatility, predications
- ◆ EDDIE makes *selectors*
  - e.g. "50 days moving average > 89.76"
- ◆ EDDIE combines selectors into *trees*
  - by discovering interactions between selectors

➤ Finding thresholds (e.g. 89.76) and interactions by human experts is laborious

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### An Example Decision Tree

```

    graph TD
      A[Is X's P/E ratio lower than the industry average by ≥20%?] -- Yes --> B[Has X's price risen by ≥ 5% since a week ago?]
      A -- No --> C[Is X's price ≥ 14-days moving average?]
      B -- Yes --> D[Buy]
      B -- No --> E[Has X's price fallen by ≥ 6% since yesterday?]
      C -- Yes --> F[Sell]
      C -- No --> G[No Action]
      E -- Yes --> H[Sell]
      E -- No --> I[No Action]
    
```

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### Syntax of GDTs in EDDIE-2

```

<Tree> ::= "If-then-else" <Condition> <Tree> <Tree> | Decision
<Condition> ::= <Condition> "And" <Condition> |
               <Condition> "Or" <Condition> |
               "Not" <Condition> |
               Variable <RelationOperation> Threshold
<RelationOperation> ::= ">" | "<" | "="
    
```

Variable is an indicator / feature  
 Decision is an integer, "Positive" or "Negative" implemented  
 Threshold is a real number

◆ Richer language ⇒ larger search space

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### A taste of user input

Given	Expert adds:	More input:	Define target:
Daily closing	50 days m.a.	Volatility	↑4% in 21 days?
90	80	50	1
99	82	52	0
87	83	53	1
82	82	51	1
.....	.....	.....	.....

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### Our EDDIE/FGP Experience


- ◆ Patterns exist
  - Would they repeat themselves in the future?  
(EMH debated for decades)
- ◆ EDDIE has found patterns
  - Not in every series  
(we don't need to invest in every index / share)
- ◆ EDDIE extending user's capability
  - and give its user an edge over investors of the same caliber

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### Arbitrage Opportunities

- ◆ Futures are obligations to buy or sell at certain prices
- ◆ Options are rights to buy at a certain price
- ◆ If they are not aligned, one can make risk-free profits
  - Such opportunities should not exist
  - But they do in London



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
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### Portfolio Optimization



### Portfolio Optimization

- ◆ Typically:
  - High risk → high return
  - Diversification reduces risk
- ◆ Task: find a portfolio
  - Maximize return, minimize risk
- ◆ Difficulty: constraints, e.g.
  - No more than  $n$  stocks
  - Not too much on one stock
  - Not too much on one sector
- ◆ Optimization problem
  - Note: how to measure risk?




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# Algorithmic Trading

## What is Algorithmic Trading?



- ◆ Program makes decisions autonomously
  - Could be expert system, machine learning, technical trading

## Computer vs Human Traders

- ◆ Programs work *day and night*, humans can't
- ◆ Programs react in *milliseconds*, humans can't
- ◆ Programs can be *fully audited*, humans can't
- ◆ When programs make mistakes, one can *learn and change* the culprit codes
  - Failed human traders simply change jobs
- ◆ Expertise in computer programs *accumulates*
  - Human traders leave with his/her experience

>> Not to mention costs, emotion, hidden agenda, etc.


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## FAQ in Automated Trading

- ◆ *Is the market predictable?*
  - It doesn't have to be: just code your own expertise
  - Market is not efficient anyway, herding has patterns
- ◆ *How can you predict exceptional events?*
  - No, we can't
  - Neither can human traders
- ◆ *How can you be sure that your program works?*
  - No, we can't
  - Neither were we sure about Nick Leeson at Barrings
  - Codes are more auditable than humans
  - If you can improve your odds from 50-50 to 60-40 in your favour, you should be happy



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# Automated Bargaining



### Bargaining in Game Theory

- ◆ Rubinstein Model:
  - In reality: Offer at time  $t = f(r_A, r_B, t)$
  - Is it necessary?
  - Is it rational? (What *is* rational?)
- ◆ A's payoff  $x_A$  drops as time goes by
  - A's Payoff =  $x_A \exp(-r_A t \Delta)$
- ◆ Important Assumptions:
  - Both players rational
  - Both players know *everything*
- ◆ Equilibrium solution for A:
  - $\mu_A = (1 - \delta_B) / (1 - \delta_A \delta_B)$
  - where  $\delta_i = \exp(-r_i \Delta)$

Optimal offer:  
 $x_A = \mu_A$   
at  $t=0$

Notice:  
No time  $t$  here

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
### Evolutionary Rubinstein Bargaining, Overview

- ◆ Game theorists solved Rubinstein bargaining problem
  - Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE)
- ◆ Slight alterations to problem lead to different solutions
  - Asymmetric / incomplete information
  - Outside option
- ◆ Evolutionary computation
  - Succeeded in solving a wide range of problems
  - EC has found SPE in Rubinstein's problem
  - Can EC find solutions close to unknown SPE?
- ◆ Co-evolution is an *alternative approximation* method to find game theoretical solutions
  - Less time for approximate SPEs
  - Less modifications needed for new problems

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### Issues Addressed in EC for Bargaining

- ◆ Representation
  - Should  $t$  be in the language?
- ◆ One or two population?
- ◆ How to evaluate fitness
  - Fixed or relative fitness?
- ◆ How to contain search space?
- ◆ Discourage irrational strategies:
  - Ask for  $x_A > 1$ ?
  - Ask for more over time?
  - Ask for more when  $\delta_A$  is low?



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### Representation of Strategies


- ◆ A tree represents a mathematical function  $g$
- ◆ Terminal set:  $\{1, \delta_A, \delta_B\}$
- ◆ Functional set:  $\{+, -, \times, \div\}$
- ◆ Given  $g$ , player with discount rate  $r$  plays at time  $t$ 

$$g \times (1 - r)^t$$
- ◆ Language can be enriched:
  - Could have included  $e$  or time  $t$  to terminal set
  - Could have included power  $\wedge$  to function set
- ◆ Richer language  $\rightarrow$  larger search space  $\rightarrow$  harder search problem

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### Two populations – co-evolution

- ◆ We want to deal with asymmetric games
  - E.g. two players may have different information
- ◆ One population for training each player's strategies
- ◆ Co-evolution, using relative fitness
  - Alternative: use absolute fitness



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### Incentive Method: Constrained Fitness Function

- ◆ No magic in evolutionary computation
  - Larger search space  $\rightarrow$  less chance to succeed
- ◆ Constraints are heuristics to focus a search
  - Focus on space where promising solutions may lie
- ◆ Incentives for certain properties in function returned:
  - The function returns a value in  $(0, 1)$
  - Everything else being equal, lower  $\delta_A \rightarrow$  smaller share
  - Everything else being equal, lower  $\delta_B \rightarrow$  larger share

Note: this is the key to our search effectiveness

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### Models with known equilibriums

Complete Information

- ◆ Rubinstein 82 model:
  - Alternative offering, both A and B know  $\delta_A$  &  $\delta_B$
- ◆ Evolved solutions approximates theoretical

Incomplete Information

- ◆ Rubinstein 85 model:
  - B knows  $\delta_A$  &  $\delta_B$
  - A knows  $\delta_A$  and  $\delta_B^{weak}$  &  $\delta_B^{strong}$  with probability  $\Omega_{weak}$
- ◆ Evolved solutions approximates theoretical

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### Models with unknown equilibriums

- ◆ Modified Rubinstein 85 models
- ◆ Incomplete knowledge
  - B knows  $\delta_B$  but not  $\delta_A$ ; A knows  $\delta_A$  but not  $\delta_B$
- ◆ Asymmetric knowledge
  - B knows  $\delta_A$  &  $\delta_B$ ; A knows  $\delta_A$  but not  $\delta_B$
- ◆ Asymmetric, limited knowledge
  - B knows  $\delta_A$  &  $\delta_B$
  - A knows  $\delta_A$  and a normal distribution of  $\delta_B$
- ◆ Also worked on limited knowledge, outside option
- ◆ Future work: new bargaining procedures

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### Evolutionary Bargaining, Conclusions

- ◆ Demonstrated GP's flexibility
  - Models with known and unknown solutions
  - Outside option
  - Incomplete, asymmetric and limited information
- ◆ Co-evolution is an *alternative approximation* method to find game theoretical solutions
  - Relatively quick for approximate solutions
  - Relatively easy to modify for new models
- ◆ Genetic Programming with incentive / constraints
  - Constraints used to focus the search in promising spaces


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### Artificial Market

Markets are efficient in the long run

How does the market become efficient?  
Do all agents converge in their opinions?

Wind-tunnel testing for new markets




### Agent-based Artificial Markets

	Agents	Markets
Applications	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◆ How to design strategies?                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Given model of market</li> <li>- Evolving robust strategies</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◆ Market mechanism design                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Enabling scientific testing</li> <li>- Regulatory design</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
Fundamental	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◆ Equilibrium strategies?                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- What would they be?</li> <li>- What if agents change?</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◆ Market efficiency                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- How does it come about?</li> <li>- Under what assumptions?</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

**Rich and challenging research, EC plays vital part**

### Evolving Agents

Should agents adapt to the environment?  
Co-evolution



## The Red Queen Thesis

*In this place it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place.*

### ◆ Chen & Yeh:

- Endogenous prices
- Agents are GPs
- “Peer pressure” (relative wealth) lead to agents retraining themselves
- Retraining is done by “visiting the business school”

### ◆ Markose, Martinez & Tsang:

- CCFEA work in progress
- Wealth exhibits Power Law
- Wealth drives retraining
- Retraining is done by EDDIE

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## Evolving Agents

### ◆ Summers, Cliff:

- Zero intelligence agents
- Market efficiency can be obtained by zero-intelligence agents as long as the market rules are properly set.
- This result challenges the neoclassical models regarding the utility maximization behaviour of economic agents

### ◆ Schulenburg & Ross

- Heterogenous agents (agents may have different knowledge)
- Agents modelled by classifier systems
- Exogenous prices
- Beat buy-and-hold, trend follower and random walk agents

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## Modelling Simulation and Machine Learning



Hani Hagraas  
Fuzzy Systems for Modelling and reasoning



Edward Tsang  
Computational finance  
Constraint satisfaction  
Machine Learning



Qingfu Zhang  
Mathematical modelling  
Optimisation  
Machine Learning

## Research Agenda in Modelling

### ◆ Modelling involves

- Identifying stake holders, and
- Describing their relations

### ◆ Relations are described

- Mathematically, or
- Procedurally

### ◆ Modelling give us a chance to find equilibrium of the system

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## Research Agenda in Simulation

### ◆ Given a model, equilibrium can be found mathematically in simple models

### ◆ In complex models, simulation is the only practical way to find equilibrium

### ◆ Simulation may reveal conditions which lead to undesirable outcomes

- Such as a crash in the stock market
- One may introduce policies to remove such conditions

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## Machine Learning in modelling

### ◆ Suppose you want to find a trading strategy

### ◆ You may build a model and simulate the performance of your strategy

### ◆ Then you may change your strategy and try again

### ◆ How many models can you test by hand?

### ◆ Machine learning does the search for you (day and night)

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## Sample Projects in Modelling

- ◆ Software Wind-tunnels project
  - Vernon Smith (Economics Nobel Prize laureate, 2002) wind-tunnel tested new auction designs
  - A number of projects have been developed in CCFEA
- ◆ High frequency finance project (Olsen sponsored)
  - Model trader behaviour in order to understand the market.
- ◆ Automated bargaining project
  - Approximated equilibrium through reinforcement learning
- ◆ Flexible workforce management project (BT sponsored)
  - Study different ways to allocate jobs to technicians.
- ◆ Related project: constraint satisfaction and optimization
  - Computational techniques used in some of the above projects

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## Why Modelling?

- ◆ Modelling has been used extensively, e.g.
  - War plans, wind-tunnels for aeroplane & car design
- ◆ A cost-effective way to assess a situation.
- ◆ Stress testing: answering "*what-if*" questions
- ◆ Machine learning enables us to *learn* policies and business strategies.
- ◆ Modelling enables us to scientifically evaluate such policies and strategies.

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## Remarks on Modelling

- ◆ Could we be wrong?
  - Of course we will make mistakes!
- ◆ “*All models are wrong, but some are useful*” (George Box 1987).
- ◆ But a model allows us to improve scientifically
  - Whereas “*intuition*” goes when people depart
- ◆ “*More calculation is better than less, Some calculation is better than none*” (translation, The Art of War by Sun Zi 6BC).

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## Modelling, Simulation and Machine Learning

For more information:  
<http://www.bracil.net/info/modelling>

## Conclusions

### Computational Finance & Economics

- ◆ Computing has changed the landscape of finance and economics research
  - We can do what we couldn't in the past
- ◆ Evolutionary computation plays major roles in
  - Forecasting investment opportunities
  - Approximating subgame equilibrium in bargaining
  - Understanding markets
  - Wind-tunnel testing new market mechanism
- ◆ Our vision: bottom-up micro behaviour analysis



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## Questions & Comments?


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<http://www.bracil.net/finance>  
<http://edward.bracil.net/>  
 (or just search for Edward Tsang)

# Supplementary Information







## Joseph Stiglitz


- ◆ Nobel Economic Prize 2001
- ◆ Senior VP and Chief Economist, World Bank, 1997-2000
- ◆ Critical view on globalization
- ◆ Founder, The Initiative for Policy Dialogue, to:
  - Explore policy alternatives
  - Enable wider civic participation in economic policymaking




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## Game Theory Hall of Fame

<p><u>1994</u> Nobel Prize</p>	 <b>John Harsanyi</b>	 <b>John Nash</b>	 <b>Reinhard Selten</b>
<p><u>2005</u> Nobel Prize</p>	 <b>Robert Aumann</b>	 <b>Thomas Schelling</b>	



# Future of Computational Finance



## Opportunities and Challenges in CF&E

- ◆ Opportunities
  - New dimensions in market understanding ([info](#))
  - Computer trading will become the norm
  - Wind-tunnel tests will become the norm
- ◆ Challenges:
  - Different types of learning mechanism
  - Large number of parameters to tune
  - What can the simulations tell us?

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## The Computational Finance Community

- ◆ Conferences:
  - IEEE International Conference on Computational Intelligence for Financial Engineering
  - Annual Workshop on Economics with Heterogenous Interacting Agents (WEHIA 2005 at Essex, Markose, Sunders, Dempster)
  - International Conference on Computing in Economics and Finance
  - International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
- ◆ Useful web sites:
  - Tesfatsion's Agent-based Computational Economics
  - Chen's AI-ECON Research Centre
- ◆ IEEE Network on Computational Finance and Economic
- ◆ IEEE Technical Committee on Computational Finance and Economics

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## Rationality

Rationality is the assumption behind many economic theories

What does being rational mean?

Are we rational?

The CIDER Theory




## What is Rationality?

- ◆ Are we all logical?
- ◆ What if *Computation* is involved?
- ◆ Does *Consequential Closure* hold?
  - If we know P is true and  $P \rightarrow Q$ , then we know Q is true
  - We know all the rules in Chess, but not the optimal moves
- ◆ “Rationality” depends on computation power!
  - Think faster  $\rightarrow$  “more rational”

“Bounded Rationality” / CIDER Theory All Rights Reserved, Edward Tsang

### CIDER: Computational Intelligence Determines Effective Rationality (1)

- ◆ You have a product to sell.
- ◆ One customer offers £10
- ◆ Another offers £20
- ◆ Who should you sell to?




- ◆ Obvious choice for a rational seller

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### CIDER: Computational Intelligence Determines Effective Rationality (2)


- ◆ You are offered two choices:
  - to pay £100 now, or
  - to pay £10 per month for 12 months
- ◆ Given cost of capital, and basic mathematical training
- ◆ Not a difficult choice



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### CIDER: Computational Intelligence Determines Effective Rationality (3)

- ◆ Task:
  - You need to visit 50 customers.
  - You want to minimize travelling cost.
  - Customers have different time availability.
- ◆ In what order should you visit them?



- ◆ This is a very hard problem
- ◆ Some could make wiser decisions than others


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## The CIDER Theory


- ◆ Rationality involves Computation
- ◆ Computation has limits
- ◆ Herbert Simon: Bounded Rationality
- ◆ Rubinstein: model bounded rationality by explicitly specifying decision making procedures
- ◆ Decision procedures involves algorithms + heuristics
- ◆ Computational intelligence determines effective rationality
- ◆ Where do decision procedures come from?
  - Designed? Evolved?

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### 1978 Nobel Economic Prize Winner



- ◆ Artificial intelligence
- ◆ “For his pioneering research into the decision-making process within economic organizations”
- ◆ “*The social sciences, I thought, needed the same kind of rigor and the same mathematical underpinnings that had made the “hard” sciences so brilliantly successful.*”
- ◆ Bounded Rationality
  - *A Behavioral model of Rational Choice 1957*



Herbert Simon  
(CMU)  
Artificial intelligence

Sources: <http://nobelprize.org/economics/laureates/1978/> <http://nobelprize.org/economics/laureates/1978/simon-autobio.html>


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### “Bounded Rationality”

- ◆ Herbert Simon:
  - Most people are only partly rational, and are in fact emotional/irrational in part of their actions
- ◆ “Boundedly” rational agents behave in a manner that is nearly as optimal with respect to its goals as its resources will allow
  - Resources include processing power, algorithm and time available
- ◆ Quantifiable definition needed?

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### Modelling Bounded Rationality (1998)



Ariel Rubinstein  
New York University

- ◆ Rational decisions are optimal decisions
  - But decisions makers often try to satisfy constraints
  - Rather than finding optimality
- ◆ Rationality comes from decision making procedures
  - Procedures should be specified explicitly
  - This put the study of procedures on the research agenda

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### Efficient Market Hypothesis

- ◆ Financial assets (e.g. shares) pricing:
  - All available information is fully reflected in current prices
- ◆ If EMH holds, forecasting is impossible
  - Random walk hypothesis
- ◆ Assumptions:
  - Efficient markets (one can buy/sell quickly)
  - Perfect information flow
  - Rational traders

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### Does the EMH Hold?

- ◆ It holds for the long term
- ◆ “*Fat Tail*” observation:
  - big changes today often followed by big changes (either + or –) tomorrow
- ◆ How fast can one adjust asset prices given a new piece of information?
  - Faster machines certainly help
  - So should faster algorithms (CIDER)



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### Evolutionary Computation

A very brief introduction  
Genetic Programming




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## Wind-tunnel Testing

Understanding the market  
Searching for market mechanism  
Learning strategies

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### Wind-tunnel tests for new markets

- ◆ New markets are being invented
  - e-Bay, electricity, roads
- ◆ Model new markets to check if they work
  - Answer what-if questions
  - Evolve agents to approximate equilibriums

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## Artificial Markets

Understanding the Stock Market

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### CHASM Research Summary

Ref: *AI-ECON*  
*Giardina et al 2003*  
*other markets*

Questions:  
→ How does the price change?  
→ What is the effect of learning by traders?

EDDIE

Fundamental

Noise

Artificial Market

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### Red Queen

... Now, *here*, you see, it takes all the running *you* can do, to keep in the same place. If you want to get somewhere else, you must run at least twice as fast as that! ...

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### CHASM Overview

EDDIE Agents  
Agents evolve  
Heterogeneous beliefs  
Example agent

Agents: technical, fundamental, noise or hybrid (mode switching)  
Experimenter controls the number of agents in each group

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### Artificial Finance Market Conclusions

- ◆ Platform supports wide range of experiments
- ◆ Conditions for stylized facts identified in endogenous, realistic market
- ◆ Agents must be competent and realistic
  - Some must observe fundamental values
- ◆ *Learning* agents (EDDIE-based):
  - Statistical properties of returns and wealth distribution changed
  - No need for fundamental trader!

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### Credit Card Payment Market

An Agent-based approach

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### Why Modelling?


- ◆ Scientific Approach
  - Modelling allows scientific studies.
  - Human expert opinions are valuable,
  - But best supported by scientific evidences
- ◆ Multiple Expertise
  - models can be built by multiple experts at the same time
  - The resulting model will have the expertise that no single expertise can have.
- ◆ Models are investments
  - Models will never leave the institute as experts do.
  - Investments can be accumulated.

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### Why Agent Modelling

- ◆ Agent modelling allows
  - Heterogeneity
  - Geographical distribution
  - Micro-behaviour to be modelled
- ◆ Representative models don't allow these
- ◆ Micro-behaviour makes the market

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### Conclusion, Credit Card Payment Analysis

- ◆ Market behavior is complex and hard to analyze
- ◆ APCM is useful for studying the card market
  - It is a good model of consumers and merchants behavior
  - Could be used to predict demands
- ◆ GPBIL could be used for searching strategies under certain requirements
- ◆ Observation: rich results... e.g.
  - Market info determines outcomes
  - More information → less dominance

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### Market-based Scheduling

Staff Empowerment  
for BT's workforce scheduling

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