

The Event Calculus on High Frequency Finance

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Ignoring the “Obvious”

- Where can we place a piece without collapsing this pile?
- We should be able to evaluate risks given our physics knowledge
- We ignore the physics in financial markets!



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The Physics in Markets

- We don't know many things in this pile
 - Pieces could be wet
 - Pieces might stick together
- But clearing rules in a market are designed!
- So we must be able to study its physics!



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Event Calculus

- Attempt to define market dynamics formally
 - to avoid ambiguity in verbal descriptions
- Markets can be described by states
- Events change the state of the market
- We want to study consequences of events
 - Maintain *consequential closure* if possible
- We want to know exactly what are included in our analysis

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An Event Calculus

State + Orders → State

- How should a state be modelled?

State = (Bid_Q, Offer_Q)

Bid_Q = ((P₁, V₁), (P₂, V₂), ..., (P_{bq}, V_{bq}))

- Where P₁ > P₂ > ... P_{bq}

Offer_Q = ((P₁, V₁), (P₂, V₂), ..., (P_{oq}, V_{oq}))

- Where P₁ < P₂ < ... P_{oq}

i.e. Order book + New orders → New State

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How Orders Are Processed

- We assume that orders are in a queue
- One order is processed at a time

Orders = (Order₁, Order₂, ..., Order_n)

State + (Order₁, Order₂, ..., Order_n) →

(State + Order₁) + (Order₂, ..., Order_n)

Order = (Order_Type, Price, Volume)

Order_Type = bid | offer

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Clearing of a sell order

- Let
 - Offer_Queue1 = ((P1, V1), (P2, V2), ...)
 - Order1 = (sell, P, V)
 - If $P1 < P$ then $((P1, V1), (P2, V2), ...) + (sell, P, V) \rightarrow ((P1, V1), (P2, V2), ...) \oplus (sell, P, V)$
 - If $P1 \geq P$ then $((P1, V1), (P2, V2), ...) + (sell, P, V) \rightarrow ((P1, V1 - \min(V1, V)), (P2, V2), ...) + (sell, P, V - \min(V1, V))$
- Here \oplus is the queue joining operator which simply puts the orders in ascending order $((P1, 0), (P2, V2), (P3, V3), ...) \rightarrow ((P2, V2), (P3, V3), ...)$

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Example snapshot of the market

	Price	Volume
offer 5	1.65	1,000
offer 4	1.64	2,000
offer 3	1.63	1,500
offer 2	1.62	2,000
offer 1	1.61	3,000
bid 1	1.60	2,500
bid 2	1.59	2,000
bid 3	1.58	2,500
bid 4	1.57	1,500
bid 5	1.56	4,000

- What is the consequence of a market order to sell 5,000 units?
 - 2,500 sold at 1.60
 - 2,000 sold at 1.59
 - 500 sold at 1.58
 - Price dropped by 1.25%*

* Assume that last transaction price was 1.60

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Trader positions matter

	Position	Price	Volume	Margin	Triggered below
Trader 1	long	1.65	4,000	4.00%	1.584
Trader 2	long	1.64	2,000	4.00%	1.574
Trader 3	long	1.64	2,000	5.00%	1.558

- Snapshot of trader positions
- Trader 1 will have to sell should price drop below 1.584, for example
- Different traders have different margins

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Effect of Margin Call

Market after clearing sell order of 5,000

	Price	Volume
offer 5	1.65	1,000
offer 4	1.64	2,000
offer 3	1.63	1,500
offer 2	1.62	2,000
offer 1	1.61	3,000
bid 1	1.58	2,000
bid 2	1.57	1,500
bid 3	1.56	4,000

- Price at 1.58
- Trader 1's margin exceeded
- Trader 1 has to sell its 4,000 units now*
- This will push the price down to 1.56
- From 1.60, price dropped by 2.5%

* Assume market mechanism with complete automation

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Cascaded Effects

	Price	Volume
offer 5	1.65	1,000
offer 4	1.64	2,000
offer 3	1.63	1,500
offer 2	1.62	2,000
offer 1	1.61	3,000
bid 1	1.56	3,500

- Price at 1.56
- Trader 2's margins exceeded now
- Trader 2 has to sell its 2,000 units (at 1.56)
- Lesson:
 - Price drop depends on trader positions
- What happens if there are no buyers left?

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Consequences of margin calls

- A trader is in long position because he/she thinks that price will go **up**
- Margin calls cause selling, which help to push the price **down**
 - Exactly the opposite of what he/she expects!
- Cascaded margin calls could lead to substantial falls in price

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Remarks

- We are not trying to predict
 - We are just studying the consequences of events under our calculus
- Consequences of an order is non-trivial!
- Given a snapshot of the market, including the trader positions, we can ask:
 - ? How big an order would cause the price to go down (up) by, say, 2.5%?
- Useful for assessing Value-at-risk
- Related work: [Liquidity Risk](#)

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Future Work

- Real markets are far more complex
- What about market making?
 - How should the market maker [review its prices](#) in response to a big purchase?
- We can define new events
 - [Directional changes](#)
- Wiki-style repository of programs
 - To enable [global collaborative research](#) in finance

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Conclusions

- Top-down classical economics challenged
- Use of physical time questionable
- Intrinsic time is more meaningful
- An **event calculus** helps to identify relevant components and study the physics of markets
 - Cascading effects can be analysed
 - New perspective to Value-at-risk

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